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ABSTRACT 
This Article explores state responsibility to the international com-
munity as a whole and to injured states in particular for the damage 
occurring from the production and use of ozone depleting substances. 
This Article argues that pollution of the environment through the 
continued use and manufacture of ozone depleting substances is in 
violation of both treaty obligations and general obligations under cus-
tomary international law. The author argues that pursuant to the 
international law principle of pacta sunt servanda, signatory states to 
the Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer and the 
Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer are 
expected to comply with specific reductions set forth in those treaties. 
In addition, customary international law based upon the practice of 
states, judicial decisions and scholarly writings, requires the preserva-
tion and enhancement of the human environment. The result is that 
a state incurs responsibility for its failure to comply with the Montreal 
Protocol phase-out requirements and to cease production of ozone 
depleting substances. 
This Article further explores the remedies available to the interna-
tional community and to individual states injured by ozone layer de-
pletion. The Article describes international dispute resolution tech-
niques that states may employ in the face of continued polluting 
activities by other states. This Article also explores remedies available 
to injured states, including required cessation of manufacture and use 
of ozone depleting substances and monetary compensation for dam-
ages. 
INTRODUCTION 
Although most governments have become more conscious of envi-
ronmental concerns, damage to the world's common spaces, particu-
larly the ozone layer, continues at an alarming rate.} The international 
community as a whole has shown greater interest in protecting the 
world's common spaces and in restricting state activities that pose a 
threat to the safety of the territories and populations of other states.2 
1 See generally THE NEW NATIONALISM AND THE USE OF COMMON SPACES: ISSUES IN MARINE 
POLLUTION AND THE EXPLOITATION OF ANTARCTICA Qonathan I. Charney ed., 1982). 
2 See generally Alexandre Kiss, New Developments in International Law, PROC. AM. SOC'y INT'L 
L. 401, 424-25 (1991) (noting cooperation between states on environmental issues). 
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The increased interest stems from the fact that "traditional notions of 
national sovereignty" have become "questionable when local decisions 
and activities could affect the well-being of the entire planet."3 
The international community has reacted to the problem of ozone 
depletion through the ratification of the Vienna Convention for the 
Protection of the Ozone Layer (Vienna Convention) 4 and the Montreal 
Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer (Montreal Pro-
tocol).5 The Montreal Protocol represents an evolution in the area of 
international environmental law in that it sets target dates for the 
phasing out of ozone depleting substances (ODS), even though the 
requisite technologies did not exist at the time.6 The Montreal Protocol 
also embodies the innovation of accommodating new scientific find-
ings and changes in the attitudes of signatory states through periodic 
conferences.7 
Despite well-quantified scientific evidence of damage to the ozone 
layerS and an increased awareness and commitment to environmental 
3 RICHARD E. BENEDICKT, OZONE DIPLOMACY, NEW DIRECTIONS IN SAFEGUARDING THE PLANET 
4 (1991). See also, Christopher D. Stone, Beyond Rio: "Insuring" Against Global Warming, 86 AM. 
J. INT'L L. 445 (1992) (noting the failure of the international community in adequately addressing 
the issue of global warming and recommending possible solutions). Although I agree with Stone 
that the international community has not been fully responsive to environmental issues, the 
dialogue initiated by conferences such as the Rio Convention marks an international conscious-
ness to this type of environmental damage and a commitment to react in some manner. The same 
is true with respect to ozone depletion and the Vienna Convention and Montreal Protocol. 
4 Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer, opened for signature Mar. 22, 1985, 
T.I.A.S. No. ll,097, 26 I.L.M. 1529 (1987) [hereinafter Vienna Convention]. 
5 Montreal Protocol on Substances That Deplete the Ozone Layer, opened for signature Sept. 
16, 1987,26 I.L.M. 1550 (1987) [hereinafter Montreal Protocol]. The Montreal Protocol was 
amended by the Montreal Protocol Parties: Adjustments and Amendments to the Montreal 
Protocol on Substances That Deplete the Ozone Layer, opened for signature June 29, 1990, 30 
I.L.M. 537 (1991) [hereinafter London Amendments]. See also Helsinki Declaration on the 
Protection of the Ozone Layer, May 2, 1989, reprinted in 28 I.L.M. 1335 (1989) (encouraging 
states to join the Vienna Convention and the Montreal Protocol and agreeing to phase out CFCs 
no later than the year 2000). Over 100 states are parties to the Vienna Convention, and over 90 
are signatories to the Montreal Protocol. U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, TREATIES IN FORCE: A LIST OF 
TREATIES AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS OF THE UNITED STATES IN FORCE ON JANUARY 
1,1994,391-92 (1994). In furtherance of the Montreal Protocol and the Vienna Convention, the 
European Union has also passed regulations on substances that deplete the ozone layer. Council 
Regulation 594/91 of 4 March 1991 on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, 1991 OJ. (L 
67) I, sets forth a trade regime, including quantitative limits on importation of substances from 
third countries, a phase-out schedule, data reporting requirements and authorizing infringement 
mechanisms. Id. 
6 BENEDICKT, supra note 3, at 2. 
7Id. 
S See also Testimony Aug. 1, 1995 of Mary D. Nichols, Assistant Administrator for Air and 
Radiation, U. S. Environmental Protection AgenlJl, Before the Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigation 
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protection issues, however, excessive production and use of known 
ODS have not ceased. Ozone layer depletion is a current problem in 
need of immediate attention, and it has been identified as the most 
immediately pressing environmental issue.9 The discharge of ODS into 
the atmosphere is expected to affect the ozone layer well into the next 
century.lO 
This Article argues that pollution of the environment through the 
continued use and manufacture of ODS violates both a state's treaty 
obligations under the Vienna Convention and the Montreal Protocol 
and its obligations under general international law. Part I explores the 
depth of the problem of ozone depletion and the responses of various 
states with respect to use of ODS. Part II examines the sources of state 
responsibility to protect the ozone layer. Specifically, Part II argues that 
treaty responsibilities and customary international law prohibit the 
damage certain polluting states are currently inflicting on the ozone 
layer. The Vienna Convention and Montreal Protocol set forth spe-
cific limitations on the use of ODS that states are expected to meet 
of the House Comm. on Commerce, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995) (affirmatively stating that the ozone 
layer is being depleted due to CFCs and other ODS) [hereinafter Nichols Testimony]; Testimony 
Mar. 16, 1995 of Jane G. Anderson, Department of Chemistry of Harvard University, Before the 
Subcomm. on Space and Aeronautics of the House Comm. on Science, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995) 
(noting that the reduction in stratospheric ozone over the Antarctic continent would not have 
occurred had CFCs not been synthesized and then added to the atmosphere) [hereinafter 
A nderson Testimony]. See also infra part I. But see Testimony Aug. 1, 1995 of Dr. S. Fred Singer, 
President, The Science and Environmental Policy Project, Before the Subcomm. on Oversight and 
Investigations of the House Comm. on Commerce, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995) (arguing that there 
is no scientific consensus on ozone depletion or its consequences); Fred Singer, OverdueFarewell 
to the Delaney Clause?, WASH. TIMES, July 12, 1995, at A21 (worldwide phase-out of CFCs is a hasty 
operation based on theoretical fears of ozone depletion and skin cancer); Fred Singer, Will CFC 
Policies Lead to Controls?, WASH. TIMES, Dec. 28, 1994, at A15 (referring to "shaky science"); Ben 
Lieberman, How Bad Science Leads to Environmental Excess and Higher Prices, WASH. TIMES, Sept. 
5, 1994, at A19 (referring to the high cost of CFC phase-out and arguing that the evidence of 
harm from CFC use is still uncertain). These authors appear to be in the extreme minority with 
respect to views on ozone layer depletion. Even they, however, appear only to point to uncertainty; 
they do not suggest that the use of ODS is definitively not a concern for the international 
community. 
9 See Consumer Ozone Protection Act of 1989: Hearings on S. 870 Before the Subcomm. on the Senate 
Comm. on Commerce, Science and Transportation, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1989) (comments of 
now Vice President AI Gore) [hereinafter Gore]; see also Ozone Depletion Over The United States, 
102d Congo 2d Sess. 854 (1992) (comments of Mr. Pell calling for urgent action with respect to 
ozone depletion); Stratospheric Ozone Depletion, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 15,097 (1991) (calling for 
stricter controls on ODS); The President's Opposition to an International Plan to Protect the Strato-
spheric Ozone Layer, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 5,939 (1990) (comments of now Vice President AI Gore 
calling for leadership from the United States with respect to the problem of ozone depletion). 
10 See infra part LB. 
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pursuant to the international law principle of pacta sunt servanda. ll 
Existing customary international law also supports state responsibility 
and, where such law is incomplete, new rules of international law 
should emerge to prevent the type of damage that is occurring.12 
Furthermore, where the immediate injuries from environmental dam-
age are not well quantified, the "precautionary principle"13 suggests 
that the international community should favor the interests of the 
countries most at risk. 
Finally, this Article examines the differing roles of developed and 
developing countries in protecting the world's common spaces. Status 
as a developing nation does not allow states to completely circumvent 
responsibilities under international law, especially where international 
conventions provide differing standards for developing countries. 14 
Developed countries are obligated, however, to provide assistance to 
developing countries to help prevent this type of environmental dam-
age. 15 
The Article concludes that ozone depleting states have incurred state 
responsibility under general international law for polluting activities. 16 
The continued production of ODS violates specific treaty obligations 
under the Vienna Convention and the Montreal Protocol. The Vienna 
Convention specifically requires states to adopt appropriate domestic 
policies to protect the ozoneP The Montreal Protocol requires specific 
reductions of ODS on a strict timetable. Instead of following this 
mandate, certain states have been at least negligent in not implement-
ing appropriate legislation and allowing the use of chlorofluorocar-
bons (CFCs) and other ODS in excess of Montreal Protocol limits, 
thereby harming the ozone. 
Furthermore, an existing rule of customary international law im-
poses state responsibility for environmental damage where an injury 
has been sustained, which will not cease unless a remedy is available, 
and where there is evidence of the damage and of the continued effects 
on population and territory. Additionally, both the international com-
11 Pacta sunt servanda is perhaps the most important legal principal in international law and 
states that parties shall observe international agreements. LOUIS HENKIN, How NATIONS BEHAVE 
19,29-33 (2d ed., 1979); see also infra part II. 
12 Jonathan I. Charney, Universal International Law, 87 AM. J. INT'L L. 529, 529-30 (1992). 
13 See infra notes 184-93 and accompanying text. 
14 London Amendments, supra note 5, arts. 2A-E, 30 I.L.M. at 539-41, 543-45. 
15 See infra notes 106-14,201-02, and accompanying text. 
16 See infra part II. 
17 Vienna Convention, supra note 4, art. 2(2), 26 I.L.M. at 1530. 
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munity as a whole and damaged states in particular are the appropriate 
parties to claim redress for damage to those portions of the world 
shared by the international community. Peaceful dispute resolution 
through negotiation, mediation, conciliation, arbitration and resort to 
the International Court of Justice (ICJ) is available pursuant to the 
Vienna Convention. Finally, the international community and, in par-
ticular, affected states should employ these dispute resolution tech-
niques and pursue all available remedies, including enforcing ODS 
reductions pursuant to the Montreal Protocol and demanding mone-
tary damages for specific injuries. If injured states and the interna-
tional community do not pursue claims for ozone depletion, serious 
environmental damage will continue. 
1. DEPLETION OF THE OZONE LAYER 
A. Causes of Ozone Depletion 
The United Nations has recognized that "[mJankind is a part of 
nature and life depends on the uninterrupted functioning of natural 
systems which ensure the supply of energy and nutrients. "18 Ozone 
depletion clearly affects all members of the international community, 
but it especially affects certain areas where the damage and potential 
for damage is apparent. 19 "The issue is global in scope and involves the 
whole international community because one country's overhead zone 
is not protected by that country's unilateral restrictions on the use of 
CFCs."20 
The proper functioning of nature's systems has been threatened by 
a declining ozone layer that is being damaged primarily due to chlo-
rine released from the production and use of ODS by industrialized 
and developing nations.21 The "ozone layer" is a thin sheet of 03 
molecules in the stratosphere that until recently completely covered 
the earth, and protected it from harmful dosages of ultraviolet radia-
18 World Charter for Nature, G.A. Res. 7, U.N. GAOR, 37th Sess., Supp. No. 51, at Annex, U.N. 
Doc. A/37/7 (1982), reprinted in 21 LL.M. 455 (1983). 
19 H. Christian Sorensen, International Agreements - Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete 
the Ozone Layer, 29 HARV. INT'L LJ. 185, 188-91 (1988). 
20 Sylvia M. Williams, A Historical Background on the Chlorofluorocarbons Ozone Depletion Theory 
and Its Legal Implications, in TRANSBOUNDARY AIR POLLUTION 267, 274 (C. Flinterman et al. eds., 
1986). 
21 WESTON ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW AND WORLD ORDER 385-86 (1990) [hereinafter 
WESTON]; Stratospheric Ozone Review Group, 1993 Stratospheric Ozone Report. 
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tion.22 Ozone is highly reactive, though, and can be destroyed by 
complex chemical reactions involving chlorine, bromine nitrogen and 
other elements.23 
CFCs and halons were the first materials proved by scientists to 
deplete the ozone layer. 24 CFCs are used in refrigeration units and in 
the production of computer chips, aerosol sprays, styrofoam and other 
products.25 Carbon tetrachloride and methyl chloroform are also 
known depleters of the ozone.26 Most recently, scientists discovered that 
even hydrochloro-flourocarbons, previously thought a safe alternative 
to CFCs, also deplete the ozone.27 Scientists are developing safe alter-
natives to ODS, however.28 
Scientists have directly linked the widening hole in the ozone layer 
over the southern hemisphere to the manufacture and use of CFCs 
and other ODS by polluting states.29 Between the years 1969 and 1986, 
losses of 1.7 to 3 percent of the ozone layer occurred over much of 
the United States, Canada, Western Europe, the People's Republic of 
China (PRC) , Japan and the former Soviet Union.30 
Total ozone depletion over the middle latitudes of Europe and 
North America is estimated at ten percent.31 Furthermore, scientists 
22WESTON, supra note 21, at 384-85. 
23 Id.; New Evidence Ties Ozone Hole to Human Activity, N.Y. TIMES. Dec. 20, 1994, at C7 (CFCs 
produced by human activities are chiefly responsible for ozone depletion) [hereinafter New 
Evidence]. 
24 See Lori B. Talbot, Recent Developments in the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the 
Ozone Layer: The June 1990 Meeting and Beyond, 26 INT'L LAw. 145, 145-46 (1992). 
25 Malcolm W. Browne, Grappling With The Cost of Saving Earth's Ozone, N.Y. TIMES, July 17, 
1990, at Cl. 
26 Talbot, supra note 24, at 148-49. Carbon tetrachloride is primarily used as a solvent in metal 
cleaning and in the manufacture of CFCs. Id. at 148. Carbon tetrachloride is approximately 10 
to 20 percent more powerful than CFCs in ozone depletion. Id. Methyl chloroform is used in 
metal and electronic equipment cleaning by industry in household products such as aerosols, 
coatings and adhesives. Id. at 149. Although methyl chloroform depletes the ozone, it is a less 
intense depleter and breaks down much more quickly. Id. at 149. 
27 Talbot, supra note 24, at 150; More Shipments of CFCs Said Entering Global Market as Phase-Out 
Deadline Nears, 17 Int'l Envtl. Rep. (BNA) 542,542 Oune 15, 1994) [hereinafter More Shipments]. 
28 More Shipments, supra note 27, at 542. Problems have developed, however, with respect to 
flammability of some of the alternative chemicals with low or no ozone depleting potential. Id. 
29 New Evidence, supra note 23, at 7 (CFCs are responsible for the ozone hole); Report Cites 
Largest Ozone Hole Ever as Thinning Occurs at a Significant Pace, 17 Int'l Envtl. Rep. (BNA) 302 
(Apr. 6, 1994) [hereinafter Report Cites]. 
30 Hole in the Ozone Layer Found at North Pole Too; Destruction Not as Severe as in Antarctic, 
WASH. POST, Mar. 16, 1990, at AI0. Losses of 15 to 17 percent were measured over Antarctica. 
Id. In the winter, the depletion is estimated to reach 50 percent ozone reduction. Id. 
31 See World Briefings, CHI. SUN-TIMES, Feb. 15, 1995, at 8; International Ozone Conference Ends 
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expect the ozone layer to continue to deteriorate for at least another 
ten years due to materials already released into the atmosphere.32 
B. Results of Ozone Depletion 
Ozone depletion has been classified by some as the most immedi-
ately pressing environmental issue.33 Antarctica is the most affected 
area with an ozone hole opening up each spring since the mid-1980s 
reaching its maximum size in early October and then slowly closing.34 
A smaller seasonal hole has also begun to appear each spring over the 
North Pole, and the high-altitude ozone layer in all regions of the 
world has become somewhat depleted.35 Ozone coverage is expected 
to continue to decline in the 1990s at least as fast as it did in the 1980s.36 
Depletion in 1993 was the highest since 1978 and is seriously threat-
ening certain areas of the world, including South America and the 
Mediterranean.37 Even though the rate of depletion has lessened due 
to reduction in ODS use and production by the international commu-
nity, it will be thirty to fifty years before any realizable improvement in 
the ozone layer is fully achieved.38 
A diminished ozone layer results in more radiation from the sun 
reaching the earth, thereby adversely affecting plant and animallife.39 
Scientists have concluded that the increased radiation could eventually 
induce genetic mutations, damage crops, and cause skin cancer, eye 
damage and a weakening of the immune system.4°There is no question 
in Greece, XINHUA NEWS AGENCY, May 19, 1995 (scientists from 40 countries called for states to 
give up ODS to save the ozone layer). 
32 Scientists Say Ozone Layer Depletion Can Be Expected For Another 10 Years or More, 17 Int'l 
Envtl. Rep. (BNA) 383,383-84 (1994) [hereinafter Scientists Say]. 
33 See Gore, supra note 9; SPecial Report, u.N. Meeting, BNA INT'L ENVTL. DAILY, Jan. 15, 1992. 
34 Malcolm W. Browne, Antarctica's Ozone Layer is Threatened Uy Depletion, N.Y. TiMES, Oct. 8, 
1994, § 1, at 7 [hereinafter Browne]. 
351d. 
36 Destruction of Ozone Layer Reaches Record Level, Agence France Presse, Mar. 12, 1996, available 
in LEXIS, World Library, Mp File; Philippe Naughton, u.N. Scientists Say Damage to Ozone Layer 
Not Slowing Down, Reuter North American News, Oct. 22, 1991, available in LEXIS, News Library, 
Reuna File [hereinafter Damage to Ozone Layer Not Slowing Down]. 
37 Damage to Ozone Layer Not Slowing Down, supra note 36; Ozone Depletion Over Mid-Latitude 
Countries Twice as High as Expected, Scientists Report, 17 Int'l Envtl. Rep. (BNA) 418,418-19 (May 
18,1994). 
38 See Browne, supra note 34, at 7. 
39 Scientists Say, supra note 32, at 384; WESTON, supra note 21, at 386. 
40 Scientists Say, supra note 32, at 384; WESTON, supra note 21, at 386. 
1996] TRANSNATIONAL OZONE DEPLETION 267 
that the ozone is being damaged through the use of ODS, such as 
CFCS.41 
Scientific studies have concluded that ozone depletion is not only a 
distant phenomena affecting Antarctica.42 Large portions of the world's 
population and environment are already facing greater health riskS.43 
This problem is already apparent in several countries.44 "If the world 
continues using CFCs, we are going to have problems because ... fresh 
fruit, forestry and fish meal exports will be affected. "45 Scientists expect 
that most of the damage being currently inflicted will not be fully 
known for another ten to fifteen years, when the real damages from 
cancer also become quantifiable.46 Even in less immediately affected 
areas, it has been noted that "unless we stop this trend soon, we are 
going to suffer serious damage."47 
C. Response of the International Community 
Despite some successes48 and the recognized dangers of ODS use, 
several states have raised objections to protection of the ozone layer 
41 Scientists Say, supra note 32, at 384; WESTON, supra note 21, at 386; see also Boyce Rensberger, 
A Reader's Guide to the Ozone Controversy; Ozone Layer Depletion, SKEPTICAL INQUIRER, Sept. 22, 
1994, at 488. But see Testimony Aug. 1, 1995 of Dr. S. Fred Singer, President, The Science and 
Environmental Policy Project, Before the Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigations, supra note 8 
(arguing that there is no scientific consensus on ozone depletion or its consequences); Singer, 
supra note 8, at A21 (worldwide phase-out of CFCs is a hasty operation based on theoretical fears 
of ozone depletion and skin cancer); Singer, supra note 8, at A15 (referring to "shaky science"); 
Lieberman, supra note 8, at A19 (referring to the high cost of CFC phase out and arguing that 
the evidence of harm from CFC use is still uncertain). 
42 See Nichols Testimony, supra note 8; Anderson Testimony, supra note 8. 
43 Ritt Bjerregaard Calls for Drastic Measures to Combat Ozone Depletion, European Report, Mar. 
16, 1996, available in LEXIS, Busfin Library, Eurrpt File; See Nichols Testimony, supra note 8; 
Anderson Testimony, supra note 8. 
44 Climate Change: Acid &in, Ozone Depletion May Harm Fish, Greenwire, Feb. 23, 1996, 
available in LEXIS, Cmpgn Library, Apn File; Marla Cone, Ozone Hole Blamed for Frog Decline, 
L.A. TIMES, Mar. I, 1994, at Al (research suggests that the thinning of the ozone layer directly 
harms wild animals, supported by findings that increased levels of UV radiation killing frog eggs); 
Boyce Rensberger, Sunlight and Fungus as Amphibian Hazards; While Thinning Ozone Lets in UV 
&ys, Disease Also spreads, Researcher Suspects, WASH. POST, Mar. 7, 1994, at A3 (decline in 
amphibian numbers); Anthony Boadle, Experts W~m Ozone Hole Threatens Population, Crops in 
Chile, Reuter North AnIerican News, Dec. 4, 1991, available in LEXIS, News Library, Reuna File. 
45 Boadle, supra note 44 (comments of University of Chile cellular biologist Sergio Cabrera). 
46 Id. 
47 Report Cites, supra note 29, at 302; Montreal Protocol Working Group Considers Earlier Phase-Out 
of HCFCs, 17 Int'l Envtl. Rep. (BNA) 659, 659-60 (Aug. 10, 1994) (recommending earlier 
phase-out of HCFCs, another ODS) [hereinafter Montreal Protocol Working GrouP]. 
48 See, e.g., Australian EPA Says CFC Use Will Reach Zero by Year's End, OZONE DEPLETION 
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and the schedule for the phasing out of ODS. For instance, the PRC 
and India have both resisted compliance with the Montreal Protocol 
and reductions of ODS, citing the need for technical and financial 
support from other states.49 In addition, Japan is the only developed 
state with no law prohibiting the release ofCFCs.50 In the United States, 
the State of Arizona recently passed legislation allowing the use of 
CFCs.51 Only eight out of ten Canadian provinces have passed regula-
tions to eliminate the emissions of existing stocks of ODS, despite 
commitments to pass such regulations, and most existing regulations 
are not comprehensive.52 Finally, the Russian Federation's manufactur-
ing activities and use of certain ODS scheduled for phase-out exceeds 
the limits set forth in the Montreal Protocol,53 
Several of these states have defended their continuing use of ODS, 
citing inability to comply with the Montreal Protocol because of eco-
nomic, developmental and other concerns. 54 States, however, have 
NETWORK ONLINE, 1995 WL 2266405 (May 4, 1995); Consumption of CFCs Dropped 70 Percent 
Since 1986, Halon Use Eliminated, Report Says, 17 Int'I Envtl. Rep. (BNA) 783,783-84 (Sept. 21, 
1994) (reporting on the successes of New Zealand in reducing ODS); Release Rate of CFCs is 
Slowing, Researchers Say; Environment: International Pact to Phase Out Ozone-Depleting Chemicals 
is Taking Effect, UCI Professor Says, L.A. TIMES, at B6 (the increase in concentration of CFCs in 
the atmosphere has been reduced by half since states agreed to phase out manufacture of ODS). 
The European Union reported record low imports of CFCs in the first half of 1994. Commission 
Says EU Imports of CFCs For First Half of 1994 Hit Record Lows, 17 Int'I Envtl. Rep. (BNA) 692, 
692 (Aug. 24, 1994). 
49 Talbot, supra note 24, at 146; Jawed Naqvi, India Calls for Battle Against West in Ozone War, 
Reuter Textline,July 13, 1995, available in LEXIS, World Library, Txtlne File (India has accused 
Western nations of seeking a trade advantage by promoting an early phase--out of ODS). India 
is ranked 12th in the world in ozone depletion and the People's Republic of China is ranked 8th. 
R. Senthilnathan, India Ranked 12th in Ozone Depletion, INDIA ABROAD, Jan. 12, 1996, available 
in LEXIS, News Library, Enw File. The United States, Japan, and Great Britain are ranked first 
through third, respectively. Id. 
50 INTERNATIONAL REPORT Greenpeace Calls japan Major Ozone Culprit, Ozone Depletion 
Network Online Today, Feb. 21, 1996, available in LEXIS, Market Library, Iacnws File; japanese 
Activists to Make Plea for Help in Ozone Protection Efforts, 1995 WL 2266474 Gune 7, 1995). 
51 Arizona Freon Law Meaningless from Legal Viewpoint, EPA Says, ARIZ. DAILY STAR, May 10, 
1995, at 2B (Arizona law is preempted by United States federallaw);James D. Flori, On CFC Issue, 
It's Arizona vs. World, ARIZ. REp., May 7, 1995, at F3 (noting Arizona law is preempted by federal 
law). 
52 Friends of the Earth Ozone Report Card Finds Canadian Provinces in ODS Cuts Lagging, 17 
Int'I Envtl. Rep. (BNA) 530,530 Gune 15, 1994). 
53 Montreal Protocol Wmking Group, supra note 47, at 660. The Russian Federation has cited 
economic crises as preventing the phase out of products listed in Annex A to the Montreal 
Protocol. Id. The Russian Federation is also still using halons, which were to be phased out by 
1994 except for essential uses. Id. Poland and several other Eastern European countries are 
apparently in a similar position. Id. 
54 See supra notes 49-53 and accompanying text. 
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common responsibilities toward other members of the international 
community that include the "protection, preservation and enhance-
ment of the environment for the present and future generations .... "55 
States that continue to use ODS, therefore, incur responsibility under 
international law for violations of treaty obligations under the Vienna 
Convention and the Montreal Protocol and violations of general obli-
gations to protect the environment arising under customary interna-
tionallaw. 
In the international community, especially in the realm of environ-
mental concerns, it is unimaginable that the concept of sovereignty 
would allow a state to take actions within its own borders that have 
such a serious impact on the international community to which the 
state belongs. 56 Because the use of ODS is of high concern in the 
international community, states are under the obligation to restrict 
their sovereign rights in that regard.57 Thus, unbridled use and encour-
agement of ODS transcends a state's right to exploit its own resources 
because it causes damage both directly to other states and to common 
areas beyond its national jurisdiction. 
II. SOURCES OF STATE RESPONSIBILITY 
In accepting the tenets of international law, all states give up a 
certain amount of autonomy and freedom as the cost of such partici-
pation in international relations with other states.58 The foundation of 
traditional international law has been termed "customary international 
law," formed over time by widespread practice of states acting under a 
sense of obligation.59 International agreements negotiated at interna-
tional conferences, however, have begun to codify and modify custom-
ary international law. 60 
Article 38(1) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice sets 
forth general sources of international law and provides: 
The Court, whose function is to decide in accordance with 
international law such disputes as are submitted to it, shall 
apply: 
55 Charter for the Economic Rights and Duties of States, art. 30, GA. Res. 3281, U.N. GAOR, 
29th Sess., Agenda Item 48, U.N. Doc. A/Res.3281 (1974), reprinted in 141.L.M. 251 (1975). 
56 Williams, supra note 20, at 275. 
57 [d. 
58 HENKIN, supra note 11, at 30. 
59 [d. at 33. 
&0 [d. 
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(a) international conventions, whether general or particu-
lar, establishing rules expressly recognized by the contesting 
states; 
(b) international custom, as evidence of a general practice 
accepted as law; 
(C) the general principles of law recognized by civilized na-
tions; 
(d) (j]udicial decisions and the teachings of the most highly 
qualified publicists of the various nations, as subsidiary means 
for the determination of rules of law.61 
Article 38 (1) is accepted as a valid list of some of the primary sources 
of internationallaw.62 Thus, any examination of whether states have 
incurred responsibility for continuing use and production of ODS 
necessitates a review of the sources of international law contained in 
article 38 (1 ) . 
A. Treaty Responsibilities 
Treaties, the first item mentioned in article 38(1), are the major 
instruments of cooperation in international relations and have re-
sulted in a significant expansion of international law over the past 100 
years.63 Treaties and conventions establish international rules expressly 
recognized by signatory states.64 Pursuant to the international law prin-
ciple of pacta sunt servanda, states are expected to comply with their 
international treaty obligations.65 
61 Statute of the International Court of Justice, June 26, 1945, art. 38, 59 Stat. 105, T.S. No. 993. 
62 See MICHAEL AKEHURST, A MODERN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAw 23 (6th ed., 
1987); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAw OF THE UNITED STATES 
§ 102 (1987) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT] (rules of international law are those that have been 
accepted by the international community and include: customary international law, international 
agreements, and derivations from the general principles of the major legal systems of the world); 
Stephen C. McCaffrey, The Restatement's Treatment of Sources and Evidence of International Law, 
25 INT'L LAw. 311, 318-19 (1991) (Restatement § 102 closely follows the classical Jisting in article 
(1) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice) . 
63 AKEHURST, supra note 62, at 25. 
64 Id. at 25. The word "convention" means a treaty and "treaty" also includes agreements, pacts, 
protocols, charters, statutes, acts, covenants, declarations, engagements, arrangements, accords, 
regulations and provisions. Id. 
65 See generaUy THOMAS M. FRANK, THE POWER OF LEGITIMACY AMONG NATIONS 187-88, 202 
(1990); Maurice H. Mendelson, Are Treaties Merely A Source of Obligation?, in PERESTROIKA AND 
INTERNATIONAL LAw 81, 81 (W.E. Butler ed., 1990); Charney, supra note 12, at 534; LOUIS HENKIN 
ET. AL., INTERNATIONAL LAw: CASES AND MATERIALS 389-91 (2d. ed., 1987) [hereinafter INTER-
NATIONAL LAw: CASES AND MATERIALS]. 
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The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties states that its rules 
apply to treaties between states and that every state has the capacity to 
enter into treaties.66 The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 
specifically recognizes that treaties are binding upon the signatories 
and imposes a good faith requirement of compliance with treaties in 
force. 67 Thus, international agreements create law for the parties when 
such agreements are intended to invoke compliance and are widely 
accepted.68 The Vienna Convention and the Montreal Protocol are 
such legal obligations that were undertaken by the signatory states. 
Promotion of the manufacture and use of ODS that damage the ozone 
layer is in direct contravention of these international obligations under 
the Vienna Convention and Montreal Protocol, and thus ODS-produc-
ing states incur responsibility for ozone depletion. 
1. Vienna Convention 
The Vienna Convention, sponsored by the United Nations Environ-
ment Program in 1985, specifically recognized the "potentially harmful 
impact on human health and the environment through modification 
of the ozone layer. "69 The parties observed that "precautionary meas-
ures" had already been taken at the national and international levels 
to protect the ozone layer and that such measures require interna-
tional cooperation and action. 70 The parties cited the provision of the 
Declaration of United Nations Conference on the Human Environ-
ment (Stockholm Declaration),71 which provides that a state's sover-
eign right to explore its own resources pursuant to its own environ-
mental policies is limited by the responsibility to ensure that activities 
within its own jurisdictional control do not damage the environment 
of other states or areas beyond the limits of its jurisdiction.72 The 
parties stated their determination to protect human health and the 
66Yienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, opened for signature May 23, 1969, arts. 1, 6, 8 
I.L.M. 679, 680, 682 [hereinafter Convention on the Law of Treaties]. 
67 [d. art. 26, 8 I.L.M. at 690. The text of article 26 provides that "[e]very treaty in force is 
binding upon the parties to it and must be performed by them in good faith." [d. 
68 RESTATEMENT, supra note 62, § 102. 
69Yienna Convention, supra note 4, pmbl., 26 I.L.M. at 1529. 
70 [d. 
71 United Nations Conference on the Human Environment: Final Documents, U.N. Doc. 
A/Conf. 48/14 Rev. 1, art. 21, reprinted in 11 I.L.M. 1416 (1972) [hereinafter Stockholm Decla-
ration]. 
72Yienna Convention, supra note 4, pmbl., 26 I.L.M. at 1529. 
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environment against adverse effects resulting from ozone layer deple-
tion. 73 
The Vienna Convention instructs that the "[p]arties shall take ap-
propriate measures to protect human health and the environment 
against adverse effects resulting or likely to result from human activities 
which modifY or are likely to modifY the ozone layer."74 The Vienna 
Convention adopts the "precautionary principle," which recognizes 
that waiting for threats to the environment to become actual problems 
would be waiting too long.75 This anticipatory approach has been seen 
as "a sign ... of a political maturity that has developed over the years, 
which recognized how vital it is that we act to prevent environmental 
degradation or disaster with wisdom and foresight. "76 
The Vienna Convention directs signatories to take certain measures 
that are within their means and capabilities.77 The appropriate meas-
ures under the Vienna Convention involve at least four commitments, 
including: (1) cooperating in research and information exchange; (2) 
adopting appropriate legislative or administrative measures and coop-
erating in harmonizing policies under state jurisdiction; (3) cooperat-
ing in the formulation of agreed measures, procedures and standards 
for the implementation of the Vienna Convention, with a view to the 
adoption of protocols and annexes; and (4) cooperating with interna-
tional bodies for purposes of implementation.78 Each signatory state 
must transmit, through the Secretariat, information on the measures 
they adopt in implementing the Vienna Convention and of protocols 
to which they are a party.79 Parties may, of course, adopt additional 
domestic measures compatible with the Vienna Convention.80 
73Id. 
74Id. art. 2, at 1529. 
75 Douglas M. Johnston, Systematic Environmental Damage: The Challenge to International Law 
and Organization, 12 SYR. J. INT'L L. & COM. 255, 271-73 (1985); see also Daniel Bodansky, 
Scientific Uncertainty and the Precautionary Principle, 33 ENV'T 4, 5 (1991); infra notes 187-96 and 
accompanying text. 
76 Johnston, supra note 75, at 271-73. 
77Yienna Convention, supra note 4, art. 2(2), 26 LL.M. at 1530. 
78Id. The Yienna Convention contains two annexes. Id. Annex I, II, 26 LL.M. at 1536-40. 
Annex I relates to research and systematic observations with respect to modification of the ozone 
layer and directs parties to cooperate in conducting research on the effects of ODS on the climate 
and systematic observations on the status of the ozone layer. Id. Annex I, 26 LL.M. at 1536-38. 
Annex II provides for an exchange of scientific, technical, socioeconomic and commercial and 
legal information relating to implementation of the Yienna Convention. Id. Annex II, 26 LL.M. 
at 1539-40. 
79Yienna Convention, supra note 4, art. 5, 26 LL.M. at 1531. 
8°Id. art. 2(3), 26 LL.M. at 1530. 
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The Vienna Convention establishes a conference to be held at regu-
lar intervals.8! The parties may also hold extraordinary meetings if 
supported by at least one-third of the parties.82 The conference con-
tinuously reviews the implementation of the Vienna Convention and 
performs various functions, including, submissions of reporting infor-
mation and adoption of and amendments to protocols and annexes to 
the Vienna Convention.83 The text of any protocol must be communi-
cated to the parties by the Secretariat at least six months before any 
conference meeting.84 Each protocol is subject to ratification, accep-
tance or approval by the states and regional economic integration 
organizations.85 No state, however, may become a party to any protocol 
unless it is also a party to the Vienna Convention.86 Finally, the Vienna 
Convention provides that no reservations may be made to it.87 
Certain polluting states have most often violated the second require-
ment arising under the Vienna Convention. This requires parties to: 
adopt appropriate legislative or administrative measures and 
cooperate in harmonizing appropriate policies to control, 
limit, or prevent human activities under their jurisdiction or 
control should it be found that these activities have or are 
likely to have adverse effects resulting from modification or 
likely modification of the ozone layer.88 
Furthermore, parties are directed to cooperate with competent inter-
national bodies to implement the Vienna Convention and the proto-
cols.89 Several states are attempting to absolve themselves of these treaty 
obligations by delaying enactment of appropriate legislation in contra-
vention of the Vienna Convention.90 Rather than passing appropriate 
domestic policies to protect the ozone layer, several of these states have 
cited economic and other reasons for the continued production and 
use of ODS. 
81Id. art. 6(1), 26 I.L.M. at 153!. 
82Id. art. 6(2), 26 I.L.M. at 153!. 
83Id. art. 6(4), 26 I.L.M. at 153!. 
84Yienna Convention, supra note 4, art. 8, 261.L.M. at 1532. 
85Id. art. 13, 26 I.L.M. at 1534. 
86Id. art. 16,26 I.L.M. at 1535. 
87Id. art. 18, 261.L.M. at 1535. A reservation is a unilateral statement made by a state purporting 
to exclude or vary tbe effect of certain provisions of a treaty and tbeir application to tbat particular 
state. INTERNATIONAL LAw: CASES AND MATERIALS, supra note 65, at 414. 
88Yienna Convention, supra note 4, art. 2(2)(b), 26 I.L.M. at 1530. 
89Id. art. 2(2)(d), 261.L.M. at 1530. 
90Id. art. 2(2) (d), 26 I.L.M. at 1530. 
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2. Montreal Protocol9l 
The 1989 Montreal Protocol, as amended in 1991, seeks to imple-
ment the Vienna Convention requirement that states cooperate in the 
formulation of appropriate measures to protect human health and the 
environment against adverse effects resulting from human activities 
modifYing the ozone layer.92 The parties specifically recognized that 
worldwide emissions of ODS significantly deplete and otherwise mod-
ify the ozone layer, resulting in adverse effects on human health and 
the environment.93 The parties stated their determination to protect 
the ozone layer by taking "precautionary measures" to control total 
global emissions of ODS and, ultimately, to eliminate use and produc-
tion of ODS.94 The parties further acknowledged the special needs of 
developing countries, including the need for financial resources and 
relevant technologies, which can be expected to make a substantial 
difference in the ability of all states to address the problem of ozone 
depletion and its resulting effects.95 Finally, the parties emphasized 
international cooperation with respect to technologies relating to ODS 
and the special needs of developing countries.96 
The Montreal Protocol requires specific reductions in production of 
CFCs, halons, other fully halogenated CFCs, carbon tetrachloride and 
methyl chloroform.97 This is to be accomplished by strict annual per-
centage reductions resulting in an eventual elimination of usage.9S 
Developing countries are provided a ten-year grace period with respect 
to full compliance with the phase-out.99 The Montreal Protocol bans 
the import of specified ODS from any state not a party to the Montreal 
Protocol and bans the export of ODS.loO Similar to the Vienna Conven-
91 All text references to the Montreal Protocol are as amended, unless otherwise noted. 
92 Montreal Protocol, supra note 5, pmbl., 26 LL.M. at 1550. 
931d. 
941d. 
951d. 
961d. 
9? London Amendments, supra note 5, arts. 2A-E, 30 LL.M. at 539-41, 543-45. Use of CFCs 
and halons must be eliminated by the year 2000. ld. arts. 2A, 2B, 30 LL.M. at 539-41. The other 
ODS are also set for phase-out and elimination. ld. arts. 2C-E, at 543-45. 
981d. arts. 2A-E, 30 LL.M. at 539-41, 543-45. The Montreal Protocol requires a 50% annual 
reduction of CFCs, as compared to 1986 levels, by 1995 in industrialized countries and an 85% 
reduction by 1997. ld. art. 2A, 30 LL.M. at 539-40. Halons and other ODS are scheduled for 
similar phase-outs. London Amendments, supra note 5, arts. 2B-E, 30 LL.M. at 540-41, 543-45. 
991d. art. 5, 30 LL.M. at 547-48. 
loOld. art. 4, 30 LL.M. at 546-47; Montreal Protocol, supra note 5, 26 LL.M. at 1555. Article 
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tion, states may not make any reservations to the Montreal Protocol's 
requirements. 101 
In addition to phase-out requirements, the Montreal Protocol also 
requires periodic assessment of control measures at least every four 
years. 102 The Montreal Protocol further requires parties to supply sta-
tistical data on each of the controlled ODS.I03 The Montreal Protocol 
also includes provisions with respect to research, development, public 
awareness and exchange of information. 104 
The Montreal Protocol provides two mechanisms designed to ben-
efit developing countries. First, it establishes a financial mechanism, 
which is to include a Multilateral Fund to assist developing countries 
in meeting their obligations under the Montreal Protocol. 105 Pursuant 
to this provision, the parties established a Multilateral Fund of $160 
million, which could be raised to $240 million once India and the PRC 
become parties to the Montreal Protocol.106 A fourteen member Ex-
ecutive Committee has responsibility for managing the Multilateral 
Fund.107 Grants and concessional loans are available to developing 
countries to help them implement programs to protect the global 
environment in accordance with the Montreal Protocol pursuant to 
the Global Environment Facility, administered by the World Bank. lOs 
The Global Environment Facility is coordinated with the Multilateral 
Fund by allocating resources to the World Bank for investment project 
financing included under the Global Environment Fund in the Ozone 
Four also contemplates the imposition of trade sanctions against products produced with, but 
not containing, restricted ODS. London Amendments, supra note 5, art. 4, 30 I.L.M. at 54~7. 
101 Montreal Protocol, supra note 5, art. 18, 26 I.L.M. at 1560. 
102 London Amendments, supra note 5, art. 6, 30 I.L.M. at 548-49; Montreal Protocol, supra 
note 5, art. 6, 26 I.L.M. at 1556. 
103 London Amendments, supra note 5, art. 7, 30 I.L.M. at 549. 
1041d. art. 9, 30 I.L.M. at 549; Montreal Protocol, supra note 5, art. 9, 26 I.L.M. at 1556-57. 
105 London Amendments, supra note 5, art. 10, 30 I.L.M. at 549-51. 
106 See generally World Bank: Documents Concerning the Establishment of the Global Environment 
Facility, 30 I.L.M. 1735, 1749-50, 1757 (1991) [hereinafter World Bank); Report of the Second 
Meeting of the Parties to the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, 
U.N. Environment Programme, U.N. Doc. Unep/Ozl. Pro 2/3 29 Annex II (1990) [hereinafter 
Environment Programme). 
107 See Environment Programme, supra note 106, at 14. The Executive Committee includes seven 
members from developed countries and seven members representing developing countries. ld. 
The United States has a permanent seat on the Executive Committee. ld.; see also World Bank, 
supra note 106, at 1773. 
108 World Bank, supra note 106, at 1739. The global environment facility identified four areas 
of operation including, protection of the ozone layer, limiting emissions of greenhouse gases, 
protection of biodiversity and protection of international waters. ld. at 1739-40. 
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Projects Trust Fund, which is separate from the Global Environment 
Trust Fund. lOg 
Second, the Montreal Protocol requires parties to take "every prac-
ticable step" to ensure that the best available, environmentally safe sub-
stitutes and related technologies are transferred to developing coun-
tries under fair and favorable conditions. llo At least one author has 
argued that the phrase "every practicable step" nullifies any legal 
obligation imposed on developed countries to transfer technologies to 
developing countries. lll Because every state is presumed to have the 
capacity to enter into treaties of its choosing, however, and this par-
ticular phrase was heavily negotiated, this argument is unpersuasive. ll2 
General rules of international law require states to refrain from acts 
that would defeat the object and purpose of a treaty.ll3 Therefore, 
developed states have an enforceable obligation toward developing 
countries pursuant to this provision. 
Certain states have put economics in front of the environment and 
their treaty obligations. These states should be required to comply with 
the minimum applicable reductions set forth in the Montreal Protocol, 
depending upon whether the state is a developed or developing coun-
try.ll4 The problem of ozone depletion is serious and some countries 
are expecting to phase out CFCs completely by 1995.115 Many large 
corporations are already voluntarily undertaking such efforts. ll6 If sig-
natory states do not comply with the minimum reductions expected to 
begin addressing the problem of ozone depletion under the Montreal 
Protocol, the Vienna Convention will be nothing more than merely 
aspirational. 
109 Id. at 174~7. Work programs are submitted to the Executive Committee for the Multilat-
eral Fund for review and approval. Id. Thereafter, approved funding is drawn from the Ozone 
Projects Trust Fund, which only applies to countries that are signatories to the Montreal Protocol. 
/d. Donor contributions to the Interim Fund of the Montreal Protocol totaled $160 million. World 
Bank, supra note 106, at 1749-50. 
110 London Amendments, supra note 5, art. lOA, 30 I.L.M. at 551. 
III See generally Bing Ling, Developing Countries and Ozone Layer Protection: Issues, Principles and 
Implications, 6 TuL. ENVTL. LJ. 915 (1992). 
112 See Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 66, art. 6, 8 I.L.M. at 682. 
113 Id. art. 18, 8 I.L.M. at 686. 
114 London Amendments, supra note 5, arts. 2A-E, 30 I.L.M. at 539-41,543-45. 
115 SPecial Report, UN. Meeting, supra note 33. 
116 Affiliates of Japanese, us. Firms Plan to End Use of Ozone Depleters, BNA INT'L ENVTL. DAILY, 
Mar. 19, 1992. 
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B. General International Law Responsibility 
The second source of international law identified by article 38(1) is 
"international custom, as evidence of a general process accepted as 
law. "117 Customary, or general, international law results from consistent 
practice among the states, accompanied by opinio juris, or a sense of 
legal obligation. liS Customary international law may develop quickly or 
over a long period of time.ll9 For a rule to become customary interna-
tional law, it must be accepted by the international community as a 
whole, but need not be accepted by all individual states. 120 
The primary evidence of the existence of customary international 
law is found in the practice of states. 121 Other evidence that determines 
whether a rule has obtained the status of customary international law 
includes: judgments and opinions of international judicial and arbitral 
tribunals, judgments and opinions of national tribunals, writings of 
scholars, and pronouncements by states that undertake to state a rule 
of international law that are not challenged by other states. 122 
An examination of state practice and the pertinent opinions, writ-
ings, decisions and practice of states with respect to this type of trans-
boundary pollution indicates that, despite a relatively short time frame 
in the development, customary international law is well defined on the 
subject of state responsibility for ozone depletion. Furthermore, it has 
been argued that it may be necessary to establish new rules of custom-
ary international law, regardless of the attitude of certain individual 
states, to combat environmental threats because of the risks to the 
international community as a whole. 123 Such rules are necessary to 
prevent certain states from evading the cost of environmental protec-
tion and becoming "free riders" on the efforts of other states. 124 
In addition, developments in customary international law show a 
step toward allowing third states not directly injured to seek remedy 
117 Statute of the International Court of Justice, June 26, 1945, art. 38(1) (b), 59 Stat. 105, T.S. 
No. 993. 
118 RESTATEMENT, supra note 62, § 102(2) (practice that is generally followed, but which states 
feel free to legally disregard does not contribute to customary international law); North Sea 
Continental Shelf Cases (F.R.C. v. Den.; F.R.C. v. Neth.), 1969 I.Cl 4,44. 
119Charney, supra note 12, at 536. 
120 [d. 
121 AKEHURST, supra note 62, at 25-26. 
122REsTATEMENT, supra note 62, § 103. 
123Charney, supra note 12, at 529-30. 
124 !d. at 530. 
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for environmental damage to the world's common areas. 125 There is a 
general necessity for enforcement through third state remedies, or else 
serious environmental damage caused by states will go unaddressed.126 
These obligations are similar in nature to the principle of good neigh-
borliness, which arises because of the global nature of the problem.127 
Under the doctrine of erga omnes, all states suffer an injury for breach 
of certain norms and may seek redress even though no particular 
injury may have been suffered by a particular state. 128 
1. State Practice 
As stated above, the primary evidence of the existence of customary 
international law is found in the practice of states.129 The consistent 
practice of states takes many forms, including actions of states through 
international organizations and conferences.130 Although major incon-
sistencies in state practice prevent the creation of a rule of customary 
international law, minor inconsistencies in state practice do not pre-
vent the creation of a rule. 131 Furthermore, state practice is also evi-
denced by what states say, in addition to what states doP2 Finally, it is 
important to examine whether states comply with a rule of customary 
international law because of the existence of opinio juris, a conviction 
that the conduct is required by international law. 133 Thus, the states 
must view the rule as obligatory.134 
International conferences provide states with an opportunity to cod-
ify international law on a particular subject. 135 In fact, international 
conferences have played an increasingly greater role in the develop-
ment of customary international law than state practice and opinio 
juriS. 136 The work and products of international conferences may be 
characterized as state practice. 137 Thus, general consensus at a confer-
125 See infra notes 165-69, 178-83 and accompanying text. 
126 Charney, supra note 12, at 529-30. 
127 Williams, supra note 20, at 275. 
128 See infra notes 165-69, 178-83 and accompanying text. 
129 AKEHURST, supra note 62, at 25-26. 
130 RESTATEMENT, supra note 62, § 102 rep. note 2. 
131 AKEHURST, supra note 62, at 28. 
132 Id. at 28-29. 
133 Id. at 29-30. 
134 Id. 
135 RESTATEMENT, supra note 62, § 102 rep. note 2; McCaffrey, supra note 62, at 319-20. 
136Charney, supra note 12, at 543-44. 
137 Id. at 545. 
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ence contributes to the creation of customary international law. 138 The 
overwhelming participation in the Vienna Convention and the Mont-
real Protocol indicates that the states have expressed a consensus as to 
the law with respect to ODS.139 Furthermore, even noncomplying states 
appear to recognize that ozone depletion is unacceptable and that 
phasing out ODS is both required and necessary. 
In the North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, the International Court of 
Justice (ICJ) considered whether state practice in the matter of Conti-
nental Shelf delimitation, subsequent to the 1958 Geneva Convention 
on the Continental Shelf,140 was sufficient to support a new rule of 
customary international law. 141 The ICJ suggested that a treaty rule 
might become customary international law even without the passage 
of any considerable period of time if there was widespread and repre-
sentative participation in the convention, including particularly af-
fected states. 142 The court noted that where a short period of time had 
passed since ratification of a convention, an indispensable requirement 
prior to the formation of a new rule of customary international law 
would be that within the period in question, short though it may be, 
state practice, including that of states that are specially effected, is both 
extensive and virtually uniform with respect to the provision invoked. 143 
Such practice should occur in a manner showing a general recognition 
that a rule oflaw or legal obligation is involved.144 
2. International Conventions 
In addition to the above judicial decisions, the Stockholm Declara-
tion also supports a finding that a violation of a rule of customary 
international law occurs through the continued production of ODS.145 
The Stockholm Declaration was promulgated with a view toward the 
"need for a common outlook and for common principles to inspire 
138 RESTATEMENT, supra note 62, § 102 rep. note 2. 
139 Charney, supra note 12, at 548; RESTATEMENT, supra note 62, § 102 rep. note 1; see, e.g., 
North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, 1969 I.CJ. 37 (F.R.G. v. Den.; F.R.G. v. Neth.), codifying the 
doctrine of the Continental Shelf as well as its basic principles, but not provisions containing 
reservations. 
140Convention on the Continental Shelf, opened for signature Apr. 29, 1958, 15 V.S.T. 471, 
T.I.A.S. No. 5578, 499 V.N.T.S. 311. 
141 North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, 1969 I.CJ. 37,43. 
142 [d. at 42. 
143 [d. at 43. 
144 [d. 
145 Stockholm Declaration, supra note 71, 11 I.L.M. at 1416. 
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and guide the people of the world in the preservation and enhance-
ment of the human environment. "146 The Stockholm Declaration iden-
tified the "protection and improvement" of the environment as the 
responsibility of all states.147 Section I underscores the challenges to 
the international community: 
We see around us growing evidence of man-made harm in 
many regions of the earth: dangerous levels of pollution in 
the water, air, earth and living beings; major and undesirable 
disturbances to the ecological balance of the biosphere; de-
struction and depletion of irreplaceable resources; and gross 
deficiencies harmful to the physical, mental and social health 
of man, in the man-made environment .... 148 
The Stockholm Declaration directs states to cooperate in the devel-
opment of international law regarding liability and compensation for 
environmental damage to third states.149 Article twenty-one of the 
Stockholm Declaration provides that states must balance the right of 
sovereignty with the right of other states to live in a pollution free 
environment. 15o A state has the sovereign right to exploit its own re-
sources, pursuant to its own environmental policies.151 This right, how-
ever, is not all encompassing because there is also a responsibility to 
ensure that activities carried on within the jurisdiction, or control, of 
the state do not cause environmental harm to other states, or areas 
beyond national jurisdiction.152 Thus, there is a fine line to be drawn 
between the right of sovereignty enjoyed by states which justify action, 
and the abuse that results in state responsibility for environmental 
damage. 153 A state's contention that it has an unlimited right to exploit 
146Id. at pmbl., 11 I.L.M. at 1416. 
147Id. § 1(2), 111.L.M. at 1416. 
148Id. § 1(3), IlI.L.M. at 1416. 
149Id. art. 22, 11 I.L.M. at 1420. 
150 Stockholm Declaration, supra note 71, art. 21, 11 I.L.M. at 1420. Article 21 provides that: 
[sltates have, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and the principle 
of international law, the sovereign right to exploit their own resources pursuant to their 
own environmental policies, and the responsibility to ensure that activities within their 
jurisdiction or control do not cause damage to the environment of other States or of 
areas beyond the limits of national jurisdiction. 
Id. 
151Id. 
152Id. 
153Williams, supra note 20. 
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its natural resources because of the notion of absolute sovereignty is a 
thing of the past. 154 
3. Judicial Decisions 
Article 38(1) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice 
further recognizes that judicial decisions are evidence of international 
law. 155 Judicial decisions also include the results of international arbi-
tration because there is often little difference between judicial settle-
ments and arbitration in the context ofinternationallaw.156Judgments 
of the ICJ and of national courts also fall within the scope of article 
38(1) (d).157 
The existence of customary international law with respect to protec-
tion of the environment and state responsibility for damage to the 
environment is also evidenced by the decisions of various tribunals. For 
instance, the arbitral tribunal in the 1941 Trail Smelter arbitration 
between the United States and Canada held Canada responsible under 
international law for the conduct of the Trail Smelter that caused 
damage through fumes to the persons and property of the State of 
Washington. 15s The tribunal specifically noted that states have a duty 
to protect other states from injurious acts done by private individuals 
from within their jurisdictions.159 The Trail Smelter tribunal concluded 
that state liability is incurred when: (1) injury is caused to the territory, 
properties or persons within another state; (2) the injury is of serious 
consequence; and (3) the injury is established by clear and convincing 
evidence. 16o 
Even if it is found that states injured by the continued production 
of ODS cannot quantify the type of injury required under the Trail 
154Id. 
ISS Statute of the International Court of Justice. June 26, 1945, art. 38(1) (d), 59 Stat. 105, T.S. 
No. 993. 
156 AKEHURST, supra note 62, at 36-37. 
157ld. 
158Trail Smelter Arbitration (U.S. v. Can.), 3 R.I.A.A. 1938, 1965 (1941), reprinted in 35 AM.]. 
INT'L L. 701, 716-17 (1941). The United States claimed damage resulting from the emission of 
sulfur dioxide by the smelters of the Consolidated Mining and Smelting Company at Trail, British 
Columbia. Id. at 707. To determine the probability of damage, the arbitral tribunal considered 
the length of the fumigation, the intensity of concentration, the combination of length and 
intensity, the frequency of fumigation, the time of day of fumigation, the weather conditions, the 
season of the year, the altitude and geophysical location of the fumigated area, personal surveys 
and investigations and other factors. Id. 
159Id. 
160Trail Smelter Arbitration (U.S. v. Can.), 3 R.I.A.A. 1938, 1965 (1941). 
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Smelter analysis, redress may still be available under the principle of 
third state remedies. Even if the third state's remedies are limited, the 
seriousness of the environmental damage to the ozone layer warrants 
application in the instant case. 
The principle of third state remedies for injuries to states generally 
has been supported by the ICj.161 In Barcelona Traction, Light & Power 
Co., Ltd. (Belgium v. Spain), the IC] noted a difference between "the 
obligations of a state toward the international community as a whole, 
and arising vis-a-vis another state in the field of diplomatic protec-
tion."162 The court stressed that these state obligations, by their very 
nature, are of concern to the international community as a whole. 163 
The court concluded that because these rights are so important, all 
states have a "legal interest in their protection; they are obligations erga 
omnes."164 
Furthermore, states cannot escape liability for environmental dam-
age from ODS because the manufacture and use of ODS is done by 
private corporations. In Corfu Channel, the IC] held that a state is 
responsible for damage to another state's property when the state 
knows, or has reason to know, of the danger. 165 The state becomes the 
guarantor of the private conduct, and incurs responsibility as the 
source state.166 In this case, the polluting states have knowledge of the 
excessive ODS pollution and have the ability and responsibility to 
regulate it. 
4. Scholarly Writings 
Finally, article 38(1) (d) also recognizes that scholarly writings are a 
subsidiary means for the determination of rules of international law. 167 
Although scholarly writings are not controlling, they often provide a 
161 See Case concerning the Barcelona Traction, Light & Power Co., Ltd. (Belgium v. Spain), 
1970 I.C]. 3, 32. 
162 Id. 
163 Id. 
164 Id. A violation of such an erga omnes right injures the world community as a whole. See supra 
notes 161-65 and accompanying text; see infra notes 172-76 and accompanying text. 
165 Corfu Channel (V.K. v. Alb.), 19491.C]. 4. Corfu Channel involved international responsi-
bility for the explosion of mines and resulting damage to V.K. property in certain territorial 
waters where Albania knew of the mine laying by others. Id. 
166 Id. at 18-19. 
167 Statute of the International Court of Justice, June 26, 1945, art. 38(1) (d), 59 Stat. 105, T.S. 
No. 993. 
1996] TRANSNATIONAL OZONE DEPLETION 283 
conceptual framework and other evidence of the development of cus-
tomary international law. 168 
a. The Restatement 
The customary international law outlined above is also supported in 
the Restatement (Third) on the Foreign Relations Law of the United 
States (Restatement) and other scholarly writings. 169 The Restatement 
is pertinent to an examination of the development of customary inter-
national law because it defines the "foreign relations law of the United 
States" as consisting of international law as it applies to the United 
States and domestic law that has a substantial significance for the 
foreign relations ofthe United States or other substantial international 
consequences. l7O The Restatement attempts to state "rules that an im-
partial tribunal would apply if charged with deciding a controversy in 
accordance with international law."171 Therefore, "international law" 
for purposes of the Restatement means what a consensus of states 
would accept or support. 172 
The Restatement section entitled State Obligations with Respect to 
Environment of Other States and the Common Environment, creates 
an obligation on the part of each state to ensure that activities within 
its jurisdiction conform to the appropriate standards for the preven-
tion of injury to the environment of another state or area beyond its 
national jurisdiction.173 The Restatement specifically declares that a 
state is responsible to other states for violations of its obligations to the 
environment of other states, and to the environment of areas beyond 
its national jurisdiction.174 
The Restatement also attempts to codify the customary international 
law relating to third state remedies. 175 The Restatement explains that 
some international obligations are erga omnes, or those which apply to 
all states and with respect to which any state is entitled to pursue a 
168 AKEHURST, supra note 62, at 37. 
169REsTATEMENT, supra note 62, § 601. 
170 ld. § 1.; see generally, McCaffrey, supra note 62, at 313-17. 
171 McCaffrey, supra note 62, at 313. 
172 See id. 
173REsTATEMENT, supra note 62, § 601 (1). 
174 ld. § 601 (2). 
175 ld. § 902(1). "A state may bring a claim against another state for a violation of an interna-
tional obligation owed to the claimant state or to states generally .... " ld. 
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remedy.176 Therefore, states are entitled to seek redress from other 
states for violations of international obligations owed to the claimant 
state individually or to states generally. 177 Furthermore, "[w]hen a state 
has violated an obligation owed to the international community as a 
whole, any state may bring a claim in accordance with this section 
without showing that it has suffered a particular injury."17S The Official 
Comments to section 902 of the Restatement specifically note that any 
state may call on an offending state to terminate conduct resulting in 
significant injuries to the environment. 179 Furthermore, a state may 
bring a claim for a violation of these international obligations even if 
it has not yet suffered an injury, if the state reasonably believes such 
injury is impending. I so 
b. Other Scholarly Writings 
The development of customary international law with respect to 
environmental damage is also evident in the precautionary principle. lSI 
The precautionary principle is a policy-making device that defines 
international obligations concerning environmental protection. IS2 The 
precautionary principle mandates that rather than awaiting uncer-
tainty, the international community should act in an anticipatory man-
ner to ensure that environmental harm does not occur.IS3 This is 
necessary because of the fundamental scientific uncertainties sur-
rounding many international environmental issues. 184 In instances 
where the threat of serious or irreversible environmental damage is 
present, lack of scientific certainty should not support postponement 
of measures to protect the environment. ISS The precautionary princi-
ple mandates that states should err on the side of protecting the 
176Id. § 902 (1) intro. note to Part IX. 
177RESTATEMENT, supra note 62, § 902(1). 
178Id. § 902 cmt. a. 
179Id. 
180Id. § 902 cmt. b. 
181 See Daniel Bodansky, New Developments in International Environmental Law, PROC. AM. SOC'y 
INT'L L. 401, 413 (1991); see generally Vienna Convention, supra note 4, pmbl., 26 LL.M. at 1529; 
Montreal Protocol, supra note 5, pmbl., 26 LL.M. at 1550. 
182 Bernard A. Weintraub, Science, International Environmental Regulation, and the Precautionary 
Principle: Setting Standards and Defining Terms, 1 N.Y.U. ENVTL. LJ. 173, 180 (1992). 
183 James E. Hickey, Jr. & Vern R. Walker, Refining the Precautionary Principle in International 
Environmental Law, 14 VA. ENVTL. LJ. 423, 423-24 (1995); Bodansky, supra note 181, at 413. 
184Bodansky, supra note 181, at 413. 
185Id. at 414. 
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environment. 186 In application, this often requires a choice between 
one risk and another.187 
Because the effects of ozone depletion are already apparent, the 
world's population should not continue to suffer injury simply because 
the full measure of damage is not yet known. It has been suggested 
that the precautionary principle is ripening into customary interna-
tional law, as versions of it have been included in resolutions of 
UNEP,188 the Montreal Protocol, the Vienna Convention, the Paris and 
Oslo Commissions, and the London Dumping Convention, among 
others.189 Although the precautionary principle may be difficult to fully 
implement, it is certainly useful as evidence of the development of 
customary international law in this area. 190 
C. Responsibilities of Developing Countries 
Some states have claimed that the need for economic growth justifies 
their pollution of the environment through the continued use of 
ODS.19l The efforts of the international community to protect the 
atmosphere have historically been perceived as insensitive to the inter-
ests of developing countries and incompatible with equity and justice 
among states.192 Some authorities have cited the over-consumptive be-
havior of the developed nations as the primary problem to be ad-
dressed. 193 
Merely shifting the source of the ODS pollution from the developed 
to the developing countries, however, will not alleviate the continuing 
damage to the environment and the risk to the world community. All 
states must adjust their view of sovereignty to the reality of an interde-
pendent world despite resulting restraints on national development 
186Id. at 415. 
187Id. at 417 (CFCs and DDT, for example, were originally viewed as environmentally benign 
when first developed). 
188 Report of the Governing Council on the Work of its Fifteenth Session, United Nations Environment 
Program, U.N. GAOR, 44th Sess., Supp. No. 25, 12th mtg. at 153, U.N. Doc. A/44/25 (1989) 
(recommending that governments adopt the "principle of precautionary action" with respect to 
prevention and elimination of marine pollution). 
189 Hickey & Walker, supra note 183, at 423-24; Bodansky, supra note 181, at 413. 
190Bodansky, supra note 181, at 414. 
191 See supra notes 49-53 and accompanying text. 
192 Gunther Handl, International Law and Protection of the Atmosphere, PROC. AM. SOC'y INT'L 
L. 62, 63 (1989). 
193 See Cheng Zheng-Kana, Equity, SPecial Considerations and the Third World, 1 COLO. J. INT'L 
ENVTL. L. & Por/y 57, 61-63 (1990); Ling, supra note Ill, at 95. 
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that this imposes.194 Although this presents a problem of equity on its 
face, because many of the emerging environmental policies recognize 
some form of special consideration for the developing states,195 there 
is no reason for developing states to be allowed unlimited pollution of 
the environment through ODS use. 
The Stockholm Declaration recognizes that many environmental 
problems in developing countries are caused by under-development.196 
Developing states must safeguard and improve the environment while 
directing efforts toward development.197 Developed countries are obli-
gated to assist developing countries with the transfer of financial and 
technological assistance.19B This should not be viewed as an entitlement 
framed in terms of a moral obligation of donor states to address past 
wrongs of colonialism, but rather as assistance in redressing conditions 
of underdevelopment causing local environmental disruption.199 
Status as a developing country is no reason to entirely avoid obliga-
tions present under the Vienna Convention and the Montreal Proto-
col. First, each state signed the treaty obligations voluntarily, and 
should not be allowed to materially breach its obligations because it 
now finds it economically convenient to do so. Secondly, the Montreal 
Protocol specifically provides for the special situation of the developing 
countries.20o Under this provision, developing countries are permitted 
to exceed maximum consumption and production levels for ten years, 
if they meet certain other criteria.201 Unless the developed states fail to 
provide technical, financial and other assistance required under the 
Montreal Protocol,202 developing countries must comply with their 
international obligations. Thus, developing countries are fully able to 
comply with obligations under international law, while achieving eco-
nomic growth. Therefore, the need for economic growth is not an 
adequate defense to environmental pollution. 
194Handl, supra note 192, at 64. 
195 See supra notes 106--10 and accompanying text. 
196 Stockholm Declaration, supra note 71, § 1(4), ULL.M. at 1416. 
197 Id. at 1417. 
198 Id. § 1(4), art. 9, ULL.M. at 1416, 1418; see also Handl, supra note 192, at 64. 
199Handl, supra note 192, at 65. 
200 London Amendments, supra note 5, art. 5, 30 LL.M. at 547-48. 
201Id. 
202 Id. arts. 10, lOA, 30 LL.M. at 550-51. 
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III. RECOURSE FOR OZONE DEPLETION 
A. Recourse 
Most states comply with international responsibilities, perhaps for 
no other reason than to avoid being labeled a derelict within the 
international community.203 Although "[i]t is probably the case that 
almost all nations observe almost all principles of international law and 
almost all of their obligations almost all of the time,"204 international 
law provides recourse for injured states to pursue remedies when such 
is not the case. Remedies would include damages for ozone deple-
tion.205 
General principles of state responsibility provide that when a state 
breaches its international obligations by its acts or omissions, it incurs 
international responsibility to make reparations.206 At least with respect 
to signatories to the Vienna Convention and the Montreal Protocol, 
the following is clear: 
It is a principle of international law that the breach of an 
engagement involves an obligation to make reparation in an 
adequate form. Reparation therefore is the indispensable 
complement of a failure to apply a convention and there is no 
necessity for this to be stated in the convention itself.207 
International responsibility arises regardless of the origin of the breach 
of an international obligation.208 Because polluting states have incurred 
state responsibility as a result of violations of treaty obligations and 
customary international law outlined above, the international commu-
nity of states has obtained a right to proceed against these states for 
cessation of such activities and for damages related to violations of 
international law. 209 
Under the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, a state may 
take remedial actions, even when it has sustained no particular in-
203 HENKIN, supra note 11, at 97-98. 
204 INTERNATIONAL LAw: CASES AND MATERIALS, supra note 65, at 47. 
205 See Charney, supra note 12, at 531-32. 
206 INTERNATIONAL LAw: CASES AND MATERIALS, supra note 65, at 519. 
207 Case Concerning the Factory at Chorzow (F.R.G. V. Pol.) 1927 P.C.!]. (ser. A) No.6, at 21 
Ouly 27) Ourisdiction). 
208 INTERNATIONAL LAw: CASES AND MATERIALS, supra note 65, at 520. 
209 See infra part I1I.B. 
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jury.210 Furthermore, a breach of a multilateral treaty causes injury to 
all states that are a party to the agreement, whether a particular injury 
is sustained or not.211 The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 
also recognizes certain preemptory norms of jus cogens that create ob-
ligations of individual states to the international community.212 There-
fore, there is established precedent indicating that both, particularly 
injured states and uninjured states, may seek recourse for damage to 
the ozone layer by certain states continuing production and use of ODS. 
B. Dispute Resolution Techniques 
International law does not mandate the specific form or process for 
states to employ in resolving disputes.213 Article 2(3) of the United 
Nations Charter, however, directs states to settle their international 
disputes peacefully.214 Article 33 of the Charter further directs states 
to pursue solutions through "negotiation, inquiry, mediation, concili-
ation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or 
arrangements, or other peaceful means of their own choice. "215 All of 
these procedures require the consent of the parties to resolve the 
dispute. 216 Generally, when parties withhold consent to dispute resolu-
tion, disputes follow one of three courses: they dissipate, fester and 
possibly escalate, or become the subject and justification for coercive 
measures against the withholding state.217 
The Vienna Convention sets forth specific mechanisms for settle-
ment of disputes arising among the signatories to the Convention.218 
The Vienna Convention requires parties first to negotiate disputes.219 
If negotiation is unsuccessful, the parties may seek mediation by a third 
party.220 The Vienna Convention further provides that parties, when 
ratifying, accepting or approving the convention, can accept compul-
210 Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 66, art. 1,8 I.L.M. at 680; art. 6, 8 I.L.M. at 
683. 
211 RESTATEMENT, supra note 62, § 902 cmt. a. 
212 Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 66, arts. 53, 71, 8 I.L.M. at 698-99, 706. 
213 Robert E. Lutz II, Perspectives on the World Court, the United States, and International Dispute 
Resolution in a Changing World, 25 INT'L LAW. 675, 681 (1991). 
214U.N. CHARTER, art. 2, para. 3. 
215Id. art. 33, para. 1. Article 33 of the U.N. Charter states that parties must employ this means 
whenever the dispute is likely to "endanger the maintenance of international peace and security." 
Id. 
216 See Lutz, supra note 213, at 676. 
217Id. 
21BYienna Convention, supra note 4, art. 11, 26 I.L.M. at 1533-34. 
219Id. art. 11(1), 261.L.M. at 1533. 
220Id. art. 11 (2), 26 I.L.M. at 1533. 
1996] TRANSNATIONAL OZONE DEPLETION 289 
sory arbitration or submission of disputes to the IC]. 221 Finally, if parties 
have not agreed to compulsory arbitration of submission of disputes 
to the IC], a conciliation committee must be formed to hear the 
dispute.222 
1. Negotiation 
In accordance with the Vienna Convention, the first stage of settle-
ment for depletion of the ozone should be negotiation among com-
plying and noncomplying states.223 Parties to a dispute initially employ 
diplomatic channels in implementing reparation because they are less 
formal and more likely to lead to a speedy solution to the conflict 
without embarrassment in the international community.224 In fact, ne-
gotiation resolves most international disputes.225 Negotiation assumes 
a strong role in the peaceful settlement of international disputes be-
cause it enables states to exercise control over the outcome of the 
resolution, whereas other dispute resolution techniques, such as arbi-
tration and judicial proceedings allow less control,226 The negotiation 
process generally has three steps: (l) diagnosis; (2) formulation of a 
principle to define the problem; and (3) applying the principle to 
construct an agreement among the parties. 227 The general requirement 
under international law concerning negotiation is that states are under 
an obligation to "pursue them as far as possible with a view to conclud-
ing agreements."228 
2. Mediation 
Pursuant to the Vienna Convention, if negotiation is either implau-
sible or unfruitful, the international community or injured states indi-
vidually should seek mediation of the dispute by a third party. Media-
tion occurs when more than one party to a conflict looks toward the 
same third party for assistance with peaceful settlement of a dispute.229 
221 Id. art. 11(3), 26 I.L.M. at 1534. 
222 Id. art. II (4-5), 26 I.L.M. at 1534. 
223 Manfred Lachs, The Law and the Settlement of International Disputes, in DISPUTE SETTLEMENT 
THROUGH THE UNITED NATIONS 287-89 (K. Vankata Raman ed., 1977). 
224 Id. 
225 AKEHURST, supra note 62, at 240. 
226 Lachs, supra note 223, at 287. 
227 See William Zartman, Negotiation: Theory and Reality, in INTERNATIONAL NEGOTIATION I, 2 
(Diane B. Bendahmane &John W. McDonald, Jr. eds., 1984). 
228 Lachs, supra note 223, at 287. 
229 Frank Edmead, Analysis and Prediction in International Mediation, in DISPUTE SETTLEMENT 
THROUGH THE UNITED NATIONS, 221, 246 (K. Venkata Raman ed., 1977). 
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The mediator seeks to give both parties some or all of the objects they 
are pursuing and to help both parties cut their losses.23o A mediator 
does not have any authority to require settlement of a dispute by the 
parties.231 A mediator, rather, works with the disputing parties to iden-
tify issues, explore areas of agreement, and assist the parties in formu-
lating their own settlement.232 Because mediation is a cooperative proc-
ess, rather than an adjudicatory one, parties are often able to preserve 
ongoing relationships.233 
The effectiveness of a mediator in achieving a peaceful settlement, 
however, ultimately depends upon whether the mediator can meet the 
needs of the parties.234 The longer a conflict has been outstanding 
between the parties, the more difficult it will be for a mediator to satisfy 
the needs of the disputing parties.235 Therefore, with respect to ozone 
layer depletion, the international community should not delay in pur-
suing dispute resolution techniques so that resolution at an early stage 
becomes likely and the parties avoid escalation of the dispute.236 
3. Conciliation 
The Vienna Convention allows disputing states the three alternatives 
of arbitration, resolution by the IC], or conciliation in the event that 
negotiation and mediation fail to resolve a dispute. Parties must resort 
to conciliation, however, unless the parties have agreed to accept com-
pulsory arbitration or submission of disputes to the ICJ.237 Conciliation 
has been defined as "the process of settling a dispute by referring it to 
a commission of persons whose task is to elucidate the facts and ... to 
make a report containing proposals for the settlement, but not having 
the binding character of an award of judgment."238 Like negotiation, 
the terms of settlement are merely proposed to the disputing parties 
and not dictated.239 Conciliation encourages peaceful settlements by 
230Id. at 246-47. 
231 Karen L. Liepmann, Comment, Confidentiality in Environmental Mediation: Should Third 
Parties Have Access to the Process?, 14 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REv. 93, 97 (1986). 
232Id. at 98. 
233Id. at 99. 
234Id. at 98. 
235Id. at 104. 
236Liepmann, supra note 231, at 125, 128. 
237Yienna Convention, supra note 4, art. 11, 26 I.L.M. at 1534. 
238JAMES L. BRIERLY, THE LAW OF NATIONS: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE INTERNATIONAL LAw 
OF PEACE 373-76 (Humphrey Waldock ed., 6th ed. 1963). 
239Id. 
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investigating the facts of a dispute and making a report stating them, 
rather than allowing the dispute to escalate.24o 
4. Arbitration 
Compulsory arbitration is available under article eleven of the Vi-
enna Convention to parties agreeing to such arbitration. Unlike nego-
tiation, mediation and conciliation, arbitration leads to binding settle-
ments through the application of law.241 Arbitration is both effective in 
the settlement of disputes and equitable to the states involved.242 Al-
though it is uncertain whether any of the polluting states would accept 
any demand to submit the issue of ozone depletion to arbitration, the 
flexibility of arbitration243 may be particularly helpful to any tribunal 
established to resolve claims involving damages due to ozone deple-
tion. 
To arbitrate a dispute, the parties would likely first execute an inde-
pendent agreement, or compromise.244 According to the International 
Law Commission's Model Rules on Arbitral Procedure,245 a compro-
mise should at least specifY the following: the undertaking to arbitrate, 
the subject matter of the dispute, and the composition of the tribu-
naP46 The agreement might also include applicable rules oflaw, power 
to make recommendations, power to make rules of procedure, appli-
cable procedures, quorum for the hearings, voting requirements, time 
limit for awards, ways to submit individual or dissenting opinions, 
controlling languages, manner of apportioning costs and disburse-
ments and whether the ICJ will be allowed to provide services.247 The 
arbitral tribunal settles any procedural points a compromise does not 
specifically address.248 If the parties have agreed to compulsory arbitra-
240 Id. 
241 INTERNATIONAL LAw: CASES AND MATERIALS, supra note 65, at 587. For a discussion of the 
many issues, benefits and drawbacks of arbitration, see Michael Pryles, Legal Issues Concerning 
International Arbitrations, 64 AUSTL. LJ. 470 (Aug. 1990). 
242 Convention for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes, July 29, 1899, art. XVI, 32 
Stat. 1779 (1901), 1788, T.S. No. 392. 
243 Stephen C. Nelson, Alternatives to Litigation in International Disputes, 23 INT'L LAW. 187, 
197 (1989). Generally, arbitral tribunals may resolve a single claim, may operate as a continuing 
body or may handle certain categories of disputes. INTERNATIONAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS, 
supra note 65, at 587. 
244 INTERNATIONAL LAw: CASES AND MATERIALS, supra note 65, at 589. 
245 MODEL RULES ON ARBITRAL PROC. art. 2, 2 y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 83, (1958). 
246Id. 
247Id. 
248 INTERNATIONAL LAw: CASES AND MATERIALS, supra note 65, at 591. 
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tion, the formation of an arbitral body would be an effective and 
efficient means of settling disputes related to ozone depletion because 
the arbitral body would be in a position to issue binding decisions. 
5. Redress From the International Court of justice 
The Vienna Convention also provides that the parties may agree to 
compulsory settlement of disputes in front of the ICJ.249 Pursuant to 
article thirty-six of the Statute of the International Court of justice, the 
ICj has jurisdiction over cases referred to it by the parties, or cases 
provided for in treaties or conventions in force. 25o Although resolution 
by the IC] is effective, many governments are reluctant to voluntarily 
submit to the jurisdiction of the IC] for binding adjudication. 251 Even 
amongst states submitting to resolution of disputes in front of the IC], 
jurisdiction of the IC] is often challenged.252 Therefore, resolution of 
disputes involving ODS use in front of the IC] is unlikely to occur. 
C. Specific Remedies Available 
Injured states may pursue reparations for breaches of international 
obligations. The three forms of reparations available are restitution, 
indemnity and satisfaction.253 Furthermore, Principle twenty-two of the 
Stockholm Declaration directs states to further the international law 
on both the issues of international liability and on the duty of compen-
sation.254 Pursuant to this directive, all forms of compensation should 
be available to injured states.255 
The Restatement also describes available remedies for violations of 
international environmental obligations.256 A state is responsible for 
damage and is bound to prevent, reduce or terminate the activity 
threatening the environment.257 States are also liable for monetary 
damages for the injury done to the territory of other states.258 Remedies 
249Yienna Convention, supra note 4, art. 11,26 I.L.M. at 1533. 
250 Statute of the International Court of Justice, June 26, 1945, art. 38, 59 Stat. 105-06, T.S. No. 
993. 
251 See generally Jonathan I. Charney, Compromissary Clauses and the Jurisdiction of the Interna-
tional Court of Justice, 81 AM.]. INT'L L. 855, 855 (1987). 
252Id. 
253 INTERNATIONAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS, supra note 65, at 552. 
254 Giinther Handl, PROC. AM. SOC'y INT'L L. 223 (1980). 
255Id. 
256 RESTATEMENT, supra note 62, §§ 602, 901 (states must terminate violations of international 
law and make reparations). 
257Id. § 602(1). 
258Id. 
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under section 602(1) usually begin with a protest of the violation, a 
demand to desist the environmental damage, and to make payment 
for past violations.259 The Restatement specifically recognizes that rem-
edies are available for environmental injuries within the state's terri-
tory, injuries beyond its territory, such as fishing interests, and for 
injury to the common interest in the global commons, such as the high 
seas and the ozone layer. 260 
In Trail Smelter, the United States was awarded an injunction and an 
indemnity for transboundary damage resulting in the State of Wash-
ington from pollution emanating from a Canadian corporation's 
smelter.261 The tribunal awarded damages for land and improve-
ments. 262 The Trail Smelter tribunal also cited several United States 
Supreme Court cases as support for the injunction that was granted 
against the smelter as legal guidelines in the absence of international 
cases on the subject. 263 
The remedies available to the international community and to in-
jured states particularly for continued production and use of ODS in 
excess of limitations set forth in the Montreal Protocol should span 
the entire spectrum of those available. The violation of international 
law at issue is serious, as ozone depletion is not only causing current 
damage, but continued use of ODS will inflict further damage on the 
world's population.264 The international community should demand 
cessation of the activities that are damaging the ozone layer. Currently, 
that appears to mean at least meeting the minimum reductions set 
forth in the Montreal Protocol,265 Requiring states to comply with the 
Montreal Protocol is a minimal remedy. 
In addition, states should pursue monetary compensation for all 
current damage that certain states are inflicting upon the world's en-
259Id. § 602 cmt. a. 
260 Id. 
261 Trail Smelter Arbitration, 35 AM. J. INT'L L. at 712-34. The United States also claimed 
damages for livestock, property in the town of Northport, violations of sovereignty and interest 
in business enterprises. Id. 
262Id. at 687. 
263Id. at 7i 4-16; see also State of Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co. and Ducktown Sulphur, 206 
U.S. 230, 237 (1970) ("the state has an interest ... in all the earth and air within its domain"); 
New Jersey v. City of New York, 283 U.S. 473 (1931) (New York City eqjoined from dumping 
sewage that was injurious to the coastal waters of New Jersey). But see State of Missouri v. State of 
Illinois, 180 U.S. 208 (1901); State of New York v. State of New Jersey, 256 U.S. 296, 309 (1921) 
(invasion of rights must be of serious magnitude and established by clear and convincing 
evidence). 
264 See supra part l.B. and accompanying notes. 
265 See supra part Il.A. and accompanying notes. 
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vironment through pollution and continued destruction of the ozone 
layer. These remedies are well supported by international law. The risk 
facing the international community due to ozone depletion is of a 
serious nature and is only bound to worsen, as the full effects of cancer 
and damage to the livestock, crops and marine ecosystems become fully 
known. Finally, certain states are specially affected because of their 
location and have a special interest in the resolution of the problem 
of ozone depletion caused by the use and production of CFCs. Thus, 
monetary damages should continue to be available to these states as 
damages become fully known. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Despite a relative improvement in the condition of the ozone layer, 
as compared to several years ago, states should remain diligent with 
respect to the phase-out of ODS. International law is of assistance in 
this matter and imposes responsibility on each individual state to pre-
vent damage both to the common spaces of the world and to the 
territory of other states through the use and production of ODS. 
Ozone depletion is a serious problem that has caused damage to the 
world environment invoking state responsibility for such damage un-
der international law. The sovereign rights of states are not unlimited 
where a state's activity impacts the international community to which 
the state belongs. 
Certain states are violating existing obligations under international 
law through acquiescence in the use and production of ODS. The first 
of these obligations arises specifically pursuant to the Vienna Conven-
tion and the Montreal Protocol. All states are clearly obligated to 
comply with international treaty obligations. The Vienna Convention 
specifically requires states to adopt appropriate legislative or adminis-
trative measures with respect to use and production of ODS. The 
Montreal Protocol is even more specific and requires actual phase-out 
of ODS on a gradual time table. The signatory states agreed to such a 
phase-out and mechanisms are in place to aid developing countries in 
complying with their obligations. Thus, polluting states that are signa-
tories to the Vienna Convention and the Montreal Protocol are violat-
ing state obligations based upon international treaties. 
In addition to specific treaty obligations, rules of customary interna-
tional law have evolved requiring cessation of use and production of 
ODS. Although only a short period of time has passed since ratifica-
tion of the Vienna Convention and the Montreal Protocol, a large 
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majority of the international community has signed these treaties and 
evidenced a sense of legal obligation in implementing them. This 
position is further supported by longer standing evidence such as the 
Stockholm Declaration, the judicial decisions in the Trail Smelter arbi-
tration, the IC] decision in Corfu Channel, and in scholarly writings. 
The Restatement is particularly clear with respect to the existence of 
state obligations to protect the environment of other states and the 
world's common environment. This rule of customary international 
law results in the imposition of state responsibility for continued dam-
age to the ozone layer caused by failure of certain states to comply with 
specific phase out requirements set forth in the Montreal Protocol. 
As a result of continuing pollution, the world's population is and 
will continue to suffer from increasing levels of ozone layer depletion. 
It is imperative at this juncture that the international community and 
affected states, in particular, seek enforcement of ODS phase-out re-
quirements by all available means. The Vienna Convention specifically 
provides for peaceful dispute resolution techniques available to all 
signatories. Although damages may be difficult to quantify at this point, 
cessation of polluting behavior must be the paramount concern. 
